

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH~~  
~~EXEMPT FROM GDS~~  
~~EXEMPT FROM E.O. 12958~~

August 26, 1980

## MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Discussion Paper for SCC-Security Framework (U)

Attached for your information is the State paper for item 3 of the agenda for the SCC on Security Framework which will be held on September 5th at 9:00 in the White House Situation Room. (C)

  
Christine Dodson  
Staff Secretary

NSC/S:  
Dispatched  
8-26-80  
For Your  
files

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH~~  
~~EXEMPT FROM GDS~~  
~~EXEMPT FROM E.O. 12958~~  
ATTACHMENT

Review on August 26, 1981

Declassified/Released on 2/9/92  
under provisions of E.O. 12958  
by S. Tilley, National Security Council

1c

~~SECRET~~  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

## PRESENTATION

### The US Strategy for Deterrence and Defense in Southwest Asia

This presentation is split into two parts: a summary of our approach which could also serve as an introduction to a detailed discussion and a more detailed, classified presentation.

#### INTRODUCTION/SUMMARY

(Unclassified for Public Use)

President Carter has stated our determination to respond effectively to any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region.

We place great significance on the sovereignty and independence of the states of the region. We recognize and support their determination to provide for the region's security.

The capability to protect Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf is important not only to the United States but also to the countries of Europe and East Asia who depend upon the area's resources and to the states of the region who wish to maintain their independence.

The region today is vulnerable. The long-term and unjustified Soviet military buildup is cause for concern. Moreover, in Afghanistan the Soviets have demonstrated their willingness to move despite the consequences for their relations with us, our allies, and the states in the area. A further Soviet move into this area cannot be excluded.

Our objective is to prevent such a move by the Soviets. To do so, we will need the cooperation and understanding of many nations.

The United States does not approach this question in a state of alarm but in a spirit of realistic prudence in the face of a long-term problem.

Our goal is to deter not only a Soviet military invasion, but also other forms of Soviet-sponsored aggression, as well as Soviet political pressure based on military

~~SECRET~~  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

(1d)

UNCLASSIFIED

- 2 -

strength. We do not seek to intervene in local problems or in the internal affairs of individual countries.

-- Because our objectives also serve the interests of our allies and the states of the region, we hope and expect to receive substantial support and cooperation in our efforts.

-- The main contribution of our Allies in Europe and East Asia to our strategy should be through building up their own capabilities for defense in their regions in accordance with the concept of a division of labor. They can also help by allowing and facilitating transit and overflight essential to adequate deterrence.

-- We will continue to remain in close consultation with the states of the region regarding their security concerns and the relation of US access to facilities to meeting those concerns.

-- At the same time that we are explaining our policy in this regard we are also placing the Soviet Union on notice, making it clear that any extension of their military activities beyond Afghanistan could have the gravest of consequences, and that Soviet forces must be withdrawn from Afghanistan.

b1  
b5

UNCLASSIFIED

Pages 3 - 8 remain Classified